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Abstract 
The consolidation process that characterized the banking industry in the last decades has been 
widely analyzed, but very few studies have investigated what are the reasons why a number of 
announced deals were not concluded. We fill this gap in the literature analyzing the 
characteristics of abandoned M&A operations in a large sample that includes all the major 
domestic and cross-border deals in the banking sector announced worldwide between 1992 and 
2010. The results show that hostile operations, deals of larger size and deals implying swaps of  
shares are less likely to be concluded. Controlling for size, cross-border operations are more 
likely to be successfully concluded, contrary to the expectation that the presence of strong 
cultural barriers and regulations, implicit and explicit, could determine a higher abandonment 
ratio. Finally, deals announced in countries with stronger supervisory authorities have a higher 
probability of failure. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate transactions have a critical role in market economies. The competition for corporate 
control is one of the main tools through which inefficient administrators can be removed and 
unprofitable companies can be reconverted. In the banking sector, the large wave of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) registered in the United States during the ‘80s (followed a little later 
in Europe, fostered by the II EU Directive on the Single Market) have increased significantly 
the efficiency of the credit allocation mechanism.  
However, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has made it clear that the financial sector 
was not following an equilibrium path, and the process of consolidation itself had contributed 
to the creation of banking conglomerates that were too big and too complex to save. This has 
caused a sharp reduction also in the number and value of M&As in the banking sector, from 
1,309 in 2007 to only 744 in 2010. Moreover, many of the deals concluded in the most recent 
years were organized mainly avoid the failure of insolvent intermediaries.  
The processes of consolidation in the banking sector has been studied extensively and 
there is  now a broad consensus on the determinants of domestic and cross-border M&As: larger 
and more profitable banks typically acquire weaker financial intermediaries, with the aim to 
restructure and increase efficiency (Focarelli et al., 2002).1 However, there is still a relevant 
piece of information that has not been analyzed carefully in the empirical literature: the 
determinants of the abandonment of deals that had been announced but are never finalized. 
In general, the phenomenon of abandoned deals is not negligible. O’Sullivan and Wong 
(1998), for example, show that in the United Kingdom between 1989 and 1995 almost 20% of 
the publicly announced transactions among all types of firms has not been concluded. Wong et 
al. (2001) argue that the failure may depend on several factors: the intervention of regulatory 
authorities; the success of defensive strategies implemented by the management of the target 
company; the emergence of conditions that determine a volunteer withdrawal by the acquired 
company.  
However, although a number of studies has analyzed the determinants of abandoned 
M&As in the case of non-financial companies, to the best of our knowledge, analyses of the 
banking industry are still lacking.2 This is even more surprising since the phenomenon is 
                                                          
1 Reviews of the literature on bank mergers are provided by Amel et al. (2004) and DeYoung et al. (2009). 
2 An exception is the unpublished paper of Lorenz and Schiereck (2007) that we discuss in more detail below. 
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quantitatively relevant also among banks: on average, about 5% of the deals announced in the 
world are not concluded, with peaks of over 10% in more financially advanced countries. 
Moreover, abandoned deals are among the most important: the average value of the transactions 
that are not successfully completed is more than twice that of the transactions successfully 
concluded. Indeed, a number of papers (e.g., Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Pozzolo, 2009) have 
argued that the pervasive influence of information asymmetries (Morgan, 2002) and the 
stronger role of regulation authorities make the determinants and the pattern of M&As in the 
banking sector not fully comparable with those of operations among non-financial industries. 
All these reasons call for a specific analysis for what the determinants of abandonment of 
M&As in the banking sector are. 
In this paper we try to fill this gap in the literature by studying the characteristics of 
abandoned M&As in the banking sector. Our empirical analysis is based on more than 20,000 
domestic and cross-border operations, announced in over 150 countries around the world 
between 1992 and 2010. The results show that friendly and cash-regulated operations have a 
greater probability of success. Moreover, contrary to the expectation that the presence of strong 
cultural differences, regulations, and other implicit and explicit barriers could determine a 
higher abandonment ratio in the case of international operations, cross-border deals are more 
likely to be successful than domestic deals. Operations of higher value, both in absolute term 
and relative to the size of the bidder, with more than one bidder, requiring longer negotiations 
and with targets incorporated in countries with stricter regulatory authorities and a more 
developed banking sector have instead a lower probability of success. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the framework for the 
analysis, describing the results of the previous literature and the major hypotheses behind our 
empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the sources of the data and comments the major trends 
and Section 4 presents the econometric framework. The results of the econometric analysis are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The determinants of the abandonment of announced M&As 
a. Previous evidence 
The determinants and the effects of M&As in the banking sector have been extensively analyzed 
in the theoretical and empirical literature. In a nutshell, the available evidence shows that larger 
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and more profitable banks acquire weaker banks with the aim to restructure them and increase 
their efficiency (Focarelli et al., 2002), although acquirers typically register a drop in their stock 
prices at the moment of the announcement of the deal, especially in the case of diversifying and 
cross-border operations (DeLong, 2001).  
However, not all announced deals end up being concluded, either because the parties 
involved do not find a satisfactory agreement, or because the target of the operation successfully 
adopts defensive techniques or finds an alternative acquirer. Understanding the reasons why 
some deals are abandoned is important, because it allows to better assess the likelihood of 
success of a planned operation, reducing the costs of an announcement to the market followed 
by a withdrawal. In fact, organizing an M&A is very costly, because of the effort that it requires 
to internal managers and external advisors to plan and organize the operation from an economic, 
financial and legal viewpoint, that typically requires months of activity of large teams of highly 
skilled and highly remunerated professionals. From the point of view of the target, evaluating 
the offer, bargaining on the conditions of the deal, and eventually organizing a defense can also 
be very expensive. In addition, once an operation is announced, its abandonment typically 
implies a strong negative reaction of the stock price of the bidder (Lorenz and Schiereck, 2007), 
that can in turn make it the target of a possible acquisition, and normally leads to the removal 
of the management (Franks and Mayer, 1996 and Agrawal and Walking, 1996).  
Despite its practical importance, the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of M&A abandonments is rather limited. Based on these works, we can list at 
least five major characteristics that may affect the success of an M&A. 
First, a convincing evidence shows that the most critical feature is the reaction of 
management of the target company. Jensen (1988) defines as hostile acquisitions all attempts 
of acquiring a company in which the management of the acquirer and that of the target are 
competing with each other to gain control of the new entity. Hostile takeovers are a fundamental 
tool in the market for corporate control (Kini et al., 2004), since they introduce an important 
element of competition, favoring the removal of inefficient or opportunist managers and thus 
increasing the value of the company. Indeed, hostile takeovers were relatively common in the 
United States and in the United Kingdom during the ‘80s (although in the following decades 
they became drastically less popular), and have become more common also in continental 
Europe in recent years (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
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However, there are many ways to oppose an hostile takeover, both before the offer 
occurs (pre-bid defenses) and after it is made (post-bid defenses). In the first case, for example, 
a defense strategy can be put in place by organizing a block of shareholders that are in favor of 
the incumbent management and declare themselves unavailable to sell their stakes. In 
alternative, this group of shareholders can sustain the use of debt to perform buy-back 
operations. Post-bid defense techniques may take the form of lobbying activities with 
institutional shareholders, trade unions and consumer groups, that can exert their pressure on 
the shareholders to reject the tender. A well-known post-bid defense strategy is also the 
organization of a counter-bid by part of buyers that are in favor of the incumbent management 
(also known as white knights). Additional post-bid defense techniques include the approval of 
prohibitively expensive restructuring plans, that would make unprofitable the reorganization of 
the company following the merger. These may include the payment of extraordinary dividends 
or the announcements of unexpected extraordinary profits (Sudarsaman, 1995; Holl and 
Kyriazis, 1997; Schoenberg and Thornton, 2006). Clearly, the availability of many different 
defensive techniques makes hostile operations less likely to succeed than non-hostile deals 
(Morck et al., 1989). Holl and Kyriazias (1996), for example, estimate that the probability of 
success of a friendly takeover bid, that is shared with the management of the target company, 
is 96%, while that of a hostile takeover is 61%, 35% lower. Studying mergers planned in the 
United Kingdom between 1989 and 1993, O’Sullivan and Wong (1998) find that in 47% of 
cases self-defense techniques prevented the success of hostile takeovers.  
While hostile takeovers are an important feature of the market for corporate control of 
non-financial corporations, in the banking sector the practice of hostile bids is far less common. 
A likely reason is that bank M&As require a more or less explicit approval by part of the 
regulatory authorities, that often act behind the curtains favoring the growth of “national 
champions” (Caiazza et al., 2012) or the bail-out of banks close to bankruptcy.3 In our empirical 
analysis, we will therefore control not only if a takeover is explicitly defined as hostile, but also 
the degree of risk aversion of the bank regulatory authorities of the target’s country. 
Partly related to the previous aspect, is the concession by the target of lockup clauses. 
Such clauses put a cost on the abandonment of the operation, granting to the bidder a call option 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, some European countries do not allow the use of defensive techniques in the case of deals involving 
a bank, requiring explicitly the bank’s management to remain neutral. Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands are among the countries that have not adopted the neutrality-rule (European Commission, 2007). 
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on the common shares (stock lockup) or on certain assets (asset lockup) of the target that can 
be exercised in case the target merged with another buyer, or granting in alternative the right to 
receive a cash compensation if the operation is abandoned. As expected, Coates and 
Subramanian (2000) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that deals with lockup clauses are less 
likely to fail. Consistent with this evidence, Betton and Eckbo (2000) also show that the 
probability of success is higher in presence of a previous agreement between the merging 
companies. In our analysis we will therefore control also for the presence of lockup clauses. 
A second important characteristic that affects the probability that an announced deal is 
successful is the presence of more than one bidder. By construction, the presence of multiple 
bidders implies that, even if the target is eventually acquired by one of them, all other bidders 
will be forced to abandon their plans. But it may also be the case that in presence of multiple 
bidders the probability that any offer is successful is lower than with just one offer, for example 
because multiple bids make it clearer what the value of their corporation is to the target’s 
managers and equity holders. The available empirical evidence on this issue is ambiguous: 
Betton and Eckbo (2000), for example, show that the presence of multiple potential bidders 
reduces the probability of success; but Cotter and Zenner (1994) show that competing bids 
increase the likelihood of success, while Walkling (1985) and Holl and Kyriazis (1996) find no 
statistically significant effect. Although the overwhelming role of regulatory authorities makes 
multiple bids less likely in the banking sector than in the non-financial sector, in our analysis 
we will control also for this feature. 
A third characteristics that has a crucial impact on the likelihood of success of an 
acquisition is the of payment. In fact, cash payments eliminate any uncertainty over the value 
of the exchange, which can instead be more uncertain if the payment is made by means of an 
exchange of the shares of the merging corporations. Ang and Cheng (2006) find evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis, showing that bidders are more likely to use shares as a method 
of payment when their stock price is overvalued with respect to what is predicted from its 
fundamentals. However, on the specific issue of abandonment, Asquith (1983) and Jennings 
and Mazzeo (1993) find that, in the U.S., announced equity-paid M&As are not more likely to 
be abandoned, but only cause a stronger drop in the bidder stock price than that of the 
announcement of cash-paid deals. In the case of Europe, the evidence is less neat (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008; Georgen and Renneboo, 2004; Jandik and Makhija, 2005). In our 
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empirical analysis, we will control for M&As that were announced to be paid fully in cash or 
partly in cash and partly by an equity exchange. 
A fourth element that can affect the outcome of the offer is the size of the target. On the 
one side, the management of larger companies is more likely to have the capabilities and the 
strength to implement defensive techniques, reducing the probability of success. But, on the 
other side, potential buyers are typically attracted by large deals, involving targets of larger size 
(Sudarsanam, 1995, and O’Sullivan and Wong, 1998 and 1999), and therefore tend to organize 
such bids more carefully, in order to maximize the probability of success. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence in Wong and O’Sullivan (2001) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) suggests that 
the second effect prevails: M&A bids of larger corporations have a higher probability of 
success. In our empirical analysis, we will also control for the size of the target relative to that 
of the bidder. 
Finally, a fifth factor that is likely to affect the probability of success of an announced 
M&A is the share of capital already owned by the bidder (the toehold effect). Acquirers that 
already own part of a corporation are more likely to know its functioning, to have good 
relationships with the management, and to tailor the deal in a way that is satisfactory for the 
target’s equity holders. In fact, Jeon (2009) shows that the probability of success increases when 
the percentage of the bidder already owns 5% or more of the capital of the target company.4 
Despite the large number of M&As that took place in the banking sector in the last 
decades, to the best of our knowledge the only study on abandoned deals in this sector is that 
by Lorenz and Schiereck (2007). In their analysis of 97 operations among European banks 
between 1996 and 2002, they show that failures are more likely when the bidder is small, it 
offers a high acquiring price and the announcement causes a significant drop in its stock price. 
In the following, we will try to fill this gap in the literature presenting the results of an empirical 
analysis of the abandonment of announced M&As in the banking sector, based on a sample of 
more than 20,000 cases. 
                                                          
4 An additional crucial feature that is likely to impact on the likelihood of success of an M&A is the price offered 
for the acquisition. Lorenz and Schiereck (2007), for example, focusing on the banking sector find that failures are 
more likely when the bidder offers a high acquiring price, while Betton and Eckbo (2000), find that the probability 
of success increases with the premium offered with respect to the market stock price. Unfortunately, information 
on the premium paid by the bidder is not available for most of our sample, which includes among the targets a 
large number of unlisted banks. 
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b. The empirical hypotheses 
Consistent with the literature discussed above, the most relevant variables in explaining the 
likelihood that an announced M&A operation is withdrawn are the characteristics of each deal.  
One of the strengths of our analysis is the availability of information on a large sample 
of deals from over 169 countries, that allow us, among other hypotheses, to verify also if the 
probability of  success of  domestic and cross-border deals is systematically different. In our 
baseline specification, we conjecture that the probability that an announced deal is eventually 
abandoned depends on whether: it is a hostile operation; multiple bidders are present; the 
operation is domestic or cross-border; the acquisition is paid in cash, through an exchange of 
shares, or in a mixed form; lockup clauses were agreed ex-ante or not. In addition, we control 
for the length of the negotiation process before the deal is concluded or it is withdrawn: our a 
priori is that deals that take too much time to be finalized are more likely to fail. 
While in the baseline specification we control for country characteristics including two 
separate sets of dummies for bidder and target, in additional specifications we also use cross-
country variability to study the impact of country specific characteristics on the probability of 
success of announced deals. To this aim, we substitute target countries’ dummies with a set of 
characteristics of the economy and of the banking and financial sectors.5 In particular, we 
control for: the country’s GDP per capita; the degree of risk aversion of its banking regulatory 
authorities (obtained applying the methodology of Buch and Delong (2008) to the updated 
version of the dataset by Barth et al. (2004)); the size of the banking sector and of the stock 
market (as a percentage to GDP); the ratio of the size of the banking sector and of the stock 
market (a measure of whether the country’s financial system centers on banks or on stock 
markets); the degree of concentration of the banking sector. All these characteristics provide an 
indirect measure of the hostility towards M&As. We expect that an announced deal is more 
likely to fail when the country of incorporation of the target bank has a more concentrated and 
developed banking sector, in absolute terms and relative to the stock market, and banking 
regulators with a higher degree of risk aversion. In this countries, the degree of competition in 
the market for corporate control is likely to be lower, and explicit and implicit defensive 
techniques are more easily accessible. We also expect that the overall level of development of 
                                                          
5 We do not include simultaneously bidder and target countries’ characteristics because in the case of domestic 
deals they coincide, causing collinearity problems.  
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the economy, measured for example by GDP per capita, might have an impact, since this is also 
associated with better corporate governance (Kauffman et al., 2005).6 
Finally, for a smaller number of operations, we are also able to control for some 
characteristics of bidder and target banks. In particular, we control for the absolute size of the 
deal, its relative size with respect to the total assets of the bidder, and the absolute size of the 
bidder. Consistent with previous evidence, we expect larger banks to be more likely to succeed 
when they bid in relatively smaller operations. In addition, we also control for the value of 
liquid assets of the target relative to the value of the deal, with the expectation that more liquid 
targets are more likely to be bale to put in place defensive strategies and make the operation 
fail. 
3. Data and summary statistics 
The empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of M&A operations recorded by Security 
Data Corporation (SDC) in the “Platinum Worldwide Merger and Acquisition Database”. For 
each deal, SDC reports a large set of information, on the banks involved (the name, 
identification codes such as SEDOL and ISIN, the countries of operation), and of the deal (the 
dates of announcement and conclusion, the value, characteristics such as the type of operation 
and the method of payment). Table 1 reports the definition of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis and their sources. 
Our initial sample includes 21,521 deals announced between 1992 and 2010 and 
involving banks in 169 countries. Of these, 20,539 were completed and 982 were withdrawn 
(4.6% of the total). The distribution of deals through time is not homogeneous (Figure 1). On 
average, 4.7% of the total number of announced operations have been withdrawn, but although 
the total number of M&As is evenly spread over the two periods before and after 2000 
(respectively 51% and 49% of the total), the share of withdrawn operations is higher in the first 
part of the period (65%).  
The number and the outcome of the deals is also different across countries (Table 1). 
The United States have the highest number of M&As (9,673 operations, 443 of which were 
abandoned), accounting for a bit less than half of the entire sample. It is followed by UK (1,278 
of which 26 abandoned), Japan (920 and 29) and Germany (696 and 24). Among the countries 
                                                          
6 As mentioned below, direct measures of corporate governance turned out to be insignificant. 
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with more than 100 operations, the ratio between the number of abandoned and concluded 
operations is highest in Indonesia (13.9%), Norway (12.5%), Philippines (10.7%), Malaysia 
(8.1%), China (6.7%) and Poland (6.4%). It is particularly low in Russia (1.1%), Singapore 
(1.4%), the UK (2.0%), Brazil (2.2%), Sweden (2.9%) and Switzerland (3.0%). 
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics of the characteristics of operations, 
distinguishing also between abandoned (Panels B) and concluded deals (Panels C). The average 
and median size of abandoned operations is larger than that of successful deals (370 million of 
US$ vs. 160 million for the mean, and 46 million vs. 26 million for the median). Abandoned 
operations also show a higher ratio of the value of the transaction to the bidder’s total assets 
(0.09 vs. 0.06 for the mean and 0.03 vs. 0.01 for the median). The average size of bidders in the 
case of abandoned operations is larger than in the case of successful deals (60,907 million of 
US$ vs. 55,318), but the median is smaller (3,680 vs. 4,003). Finally, the average and median 
ratio of liquid assets of the target to the transaction value is higher in the case of positively 
concluded deals (4.26 vs. 3.77 for the mean and 0.91 vs.0.87 for the median). 
Focusing on the characteristics of the countries where the target bank is incorporated, 
there is no clear relationship with the probability that an announced M&A is abandoned. 
Comparing the subsamples of completed and uncompleted deals, Table 3 shows that the average 
and median credit to GDP ratio is slightly higher for the sample of competed deals (134.4 vs. 
128.5 for the mean and 140.3 vs. 135.5 for the median), but also that the average stock market 
is relatively more developed in comparison with the banking sector (1.81 vs. 1.72); GDP per 
capita is smaller in the sample of abandoned deals (28,964 vs. 26,612 for the mean and 30,047 
vs. 28,763 for the median), while regulators’ risk aversion and concentration are quite similar.   
The pairways correlation matrix, reported in Table 4, shows that the probability that a 
deal is abandoned is strongly correlated only with it being a hostile operation and with the 
presence of multiple bidders. In most of the other cases the sign is consistent with the 
hypotheses described above, but the correlation itself is very low.  
These first evidences therefore provide only weak evidence on the characteristics of the 
deals that are more likely to be abandoned. However, this may be due to the fact that mean and 
median comparisons and bilateral correlations may hide more complex patterns among, 
possibly correlated, deal and bank characteristics. For this reason, in the following we report 
the results of a multivariate econometric analysis aimed at verifying the combined effect of 
different characteristics on the probability of abandonment and on the duration of the deal. 
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4. Econometric specifications 
To study the probability of abandonment of an announced M&A, our baseline econometric 
specification is the following binomial model: 
Pr (Yijkst = k) = F (Xijkst, BBijt, CCst, CDjs, TDt),  k = 0, 1  (1) 
where Yijkst = 1 if a deal in which bank i of country j bids for bank k in country s in year t is 
abandoned and Yijkst = 0 if the deal is completed; Xijkst is a vector of characteristics of each deal; 
BBijt are characteristics of bidder banks at time t; CCst is a vector of characteristics of the country 
of incorporation of the target bank at time t; CDjs are country dummies; and TDt are time 
dummies. The model is estimated using a probit specification, with standard errors clustered at 
the level of the country of the target bank. 
In addition to the binomial specification model, we also estimate a survival-time data 
model using the method of proportional hazards regression first proposed by Cox (1972): 
   ijkst
β'M
ijkst tλetλ
ijkst
0

  (2) 
where 0 is the ‘baseline’ hazard, and Mijkst, the set of explanatory variables affecting the hazard 
rate, is the same included in the binomial specification (i.e,, Mijkst is obtained by stacking 
horizontally Xijkst, BBijt, CCst, CDjs and TDt).  
5. Empirical results 
a. Binomial specification 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the binomial model including among the explanatory 
variables the characteristics of each deal and controlling for country characteristics with the 
country dummies.  
Consistent with the previous literature, the results show that hostile deals are less likely 
to be concluded, as shown by the positive coefficient, statistically significant at 1% level. The 
marginal effect of 0.37 implies that the probability of abandonment increases is 37 percentages 
points higher if the deal is hostile than if it is amicable, a strong effect if compared with the 
unconditional probability of abandonment, which is 4.7%.  
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The presence of more than one potential bidder also has a strong positive and highly 
statistically significant effect on the probability of abandonment, with a marginal effect of 0.39. 
While this is partly a mechanical result, because only one of the multiple bidders can eventually 
acquire the target, in unreported regressions (available from the authors upon request) we have 
verified that including a single observation for each target, taking the value of one if none of 
the bidders eventually concluded the deal, this result is still confirmed. This suggests that 
multiple bidders contrast each other, making it easier for the target to avoid the acquisition. 
Cross-border deals are significantly less likely to be abandoned, although the marginal 
effect is less than 1%. Since there are few doubts that organizing a cross-border deal entails 
higher explicit and implicit costs (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005; Chakrabarti et al., 2009, 
Pozzolo, 2009; Caiazza et al., 2014), this results suggest that banks follow a risk averse strategy, 
and only start and announce those operations that have a high probability of success.  
Transactions in which the payment is made in shares have a lower probability to be 
completed, as evidenced by the positive and highly statistically significant coefficient of the 
associated dummy variable. Although the marginal effect is in this case just 3%, this evidence 
is consistent with the view that a higher degree of uncertainty related to the difference between 
the price of exchange and the future development of the market price reduces the appeal of the 
deal. Similarly, deals paid part in cash and part with equity exchanges are also more likely to 
be abandoned, although the coefficient is in this case statistically significant only at the 10% 
level, and the marginal effect is less than 1%.  
Transactions including some type of lockup clause have a significantly lower probability 
of abandonment, consistent with the fact that they impose a high cost on additional potential 
bidders, but the marginal effect is also in this case relatively low (2.8%).  
As the length of the negotiation increases, the likelihood that the deal is concluded tends 
to decrease. The marginal effect of 0.0001 implies that a within sample one standard deviation 
change in the number of days leads to a 1.5% change in the probability that the deal is 
abandoned. 
Finally, dummies for the specialization of the target banks, unreported for brevity, show 
that deals where the target is a commercial bank or a bank holding company are relatively more 
likely to be abandoned than those where the target is a saving and loan institution or a mortgage 
bank. 
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While these results are consistent with the previous literature on the determinants of 
abandonment of M&As in the non-financial sector, and with the conventional wisdom, what is 
more striking is the low marginal effect of most of the deal characteristics, except for the cases 
of hostile deals and those with multiple bidders.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of a specification similar to that in Panel A, but 
in which the dummy variables for each target country have been replaced by the characteristics 
of the target’s economy and of its banking and financial sector. Despite a large drop in the 
number of observations, this second specification confirms the results of the previous one, with 
the only exception of the coefficient for cross-border operations, which remains negative but 
becomes statistically insignificant (although its marginal effect is larger than that of the 
previous specification).  
Consistent with our hypothesis that regulators can have a strong power in hindering 
M&A deals, the results show that operations involving targets incorporated in countries where 
the regulatory authorities have a higher degree of risk aversion are  more likely to be abandoned, 
although the marginal effect of a within-sample one standard deviation change is less than 1% 
(as for most of the country characteristics). Similarly, abandonments are more likely when the 
target is incorporated in a country where the banking sector is larger, both relative to GDP and 
with respect to the stock market, consistent with the view that acquisitions in more developed 
banking markets are overall more difficult. Finally, operations involving targets of richer 
countries, that generally have higher transparency and a stronger rule of law, are less likely to 
fail.7  
Table 6 presents the results of a number of specifications that include among the 
explanatory variables some additional characteristics of the deal and of the bidder and target 
banks, not considered in the specifications of Table 5. Unfortunately, these information are not 
available for the full sample of deals, leading in some cases to a significant reduction in the 
number of observations available for the estimation.  
Panel A shows the results of a specification with dummy variables for bidder and target 
countries, similar to that of Panel A of Table 5, but including in addition the value of the 
transaction. Although the number of observations drops to 10,922, slightly more than half of 
those initially available, the results are reassuring on the robustness of the previous estimates, 
                                                          
7 However, in unreported regressions we have not been able to find that explicit measures of the rule of law have 
a statistically significant effect on the probability of abandonment. 
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as shown by the broad invariance of the coefficients and the marginal effects with respect to 
those reported in Table 5. The only exception is the coefficient of the dummies for transactions 
settled through equity exchanges and with a mix of cash and equity exchanges, which become 
statistically insignificant. However, in unreported additional regressions we have verified that 
the loss of statistical significance is due to the reduction of the sample size, and not to the 
possible distortion induced by the lack of control for the size of the transaction in the previous 
regressions. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the logarithm of the transaction value is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level. In the banking sector, larger deals have therefore 
a lower probability of success, contrary to what happens in the manufacturing sector; the 
marginal effect of a one standard deviation of the logarithm of the deal value is 1.7%, that is 
non negligible with respect to the sample unconditional mean of 4.8% .  
The results presented in Panel B, obtained from an even smaller sample of 4,535 
observations, also confirm the importance of the relative size of the banks involved in the deal.8 
Not only deals that are larger in absolute value have a lower probability of success, but also 
transactions in which the bidding bank is larger have a lower probability of being abandoned. 
The coefficient in this case is statistically significant at 1% level, although the marginal effect 
of a one standard deviation change is less than 1%. The relative size of the deal with respect to 
the total assets of the bidding bank has instead no statistically significant effect.  
Finally, in the specification reported in Panel C we have added as an additional 
explanatory variable the value of the liquid assets of the target bank as a ratio to the total value 
of the deal. The number of observations drops in this case to 882, making some of the 
coefficients previously estimated statistically insignificant. In particular, those of the lockup 
clause, of the length of the negotiation and, noticeably, of the value of the transaction. However, 
also in this case we have verified that the loss of statistical significance is due to the reduction 
of the sample size and not to the possible distortion induced by omitting to control for the level 
of liquid assets of the target bank. Consistent with our expectations, target banks with greater 
liquidity are more able to oppose to the acquisition, significantly increasing the probability that 
they are abandoned, although with a small marginal effect. 
                                                          
8 Noticeably, in this and the following specifications of Panel C, the coefficient of the dummy for stock payments  
is again statistically significant. 
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b. Survival time model 
To gain a better understanding of the reasons why longer negotiations are more likely 
to lead to the abandonment of an operation, we have finally estimated the duration model 
described in equation (2). The results reported in Table 7 provide strong support to the view 
that deals that are more likely to be abandoned share the same characteristics as those that 
require longer negotiations. Indeed, longer negotiations typically regard hostile deals, deals 
with multiple bidders, deals paid by equity exchanges, and larger deals (Panel B). On the 
contrary, cross-border deals, those involving institutions with a lockup clause, and those where 
the bidder is a larger bank are more likely to succeed. 
6. Conclusions 
M&As in the banking sector have helped in the past three decades to radically change financial 
markets, becoming a characterizing element of that process of international integration that is 
generically defined as “globalization”. Determinants, directions and consequences of bank 
M&As have been analyzed in detail, but little is known of the reasons why some operations 
that are announced turn out to be unsuccessful. 
This study sought to answer this question. The results of the empirical analysis are 
consistent with expectations and with economic rationality: the operations most likely to fail 
are those hostile and for which the final value of the payment is more uncertain, as in the case 
of equity swaps. More interestingly, our evidence shows that larger deals have a greater 
probability of failure, even though is it reasonable to expect that they are those better organized. 
Even controlling for size, cross-border operations are instead more likely to succeed, contrary 
to the expectation that the presence of strong cultural barriers and regulations could determine 
a higher abandonment ratio. Greater interference of supervisory authorities, not always fully 
favorable to a competitive market for corporate control, leads instead to a higher probability of 
failure. Finally, we have found that deals that are more likely to be abandoned are also more 
likely to require longer negotiations, independent on their outcome. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that large and hostile deals, and 
those where the target is incorporated in countries more capable of putting in place obstructive 
techniques are more likely to be unsuccessful. This provides additional evidence that the market 
for corporate control in the banking sector may not be fully competitive. Whether this is 
16 
 
consistent with value and welfare maximization is a question that goes beyond our analysis and 
requires further research. 
  
17 
 
References 
Amel D., Banes C., Panetta F. and Salleo C., 2004. Consolidation and efficiency in the financial 
sector: a review of the international evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 2493-2519. 
Ang J.S. and Cheng Y., 2006. Direct evidence of the market-driven acquisition theory. The 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 39, 199- 216. 
Asquith P., 1983. Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 11, 51-83. 
Barth J.R., Caprio G.J. and Levine R., 2004. Bank regulation and supervision: what works best? 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13, 205-248. 
Bates T.W. and Lemmon M.L., 2003. Breaking up is hard to do? An analysis of termination fee 
provisions and merger outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 469-504. 
Betton S. and Eckbo B.E., 2000. Toeholds, bid-jumps and expected payoffs in takeovers. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 13, 841-882. 
Buch BC.M. and DeLong G., 2008. Do weak supervisory systems encourage bank risk-taking? 
Journal of Financial Stability,4, 23-29. 
Caiazza S., Pozzolo A.F. and Trovato G., 2014. Do domestic and cross-border M&As differ? 
Cross-country evidence from the banking sector. Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 967-981. 
Caiazza S., Pozzolo A.F. and Claire A., 2012. What do bank acquires want? Evidence from 
worldwide bank M&A targets. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 2641-2659. 
Coates J.C. and Subramanian G., 2000. A buy side model of lockups: theory and evidence. 
Stanford Law Review, 53, 307-396. 
Cotter J.F. and Zenner M., 1994. How managerial wealth affects the tender process. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 35, 63-97. 
Cox, D., 1972. Regression Models and Life Tables, Journal of the Royal Statisical Society, 
Series B 34, 187-220. 
DeLong G.L., 2001. Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 221-252. 
DeYoung R., Evanoff D.D. and Molyneux P., 2009. Mergers and acquisitions of the financial 
institutions: a review of the post-2000 literature. Journal of Financial Services Research, 2-3, 
87-110.  
European Commission, 2007. Report on the implementation of the directive of takeover bids. 
Commission Staff Working Document. 
18 
 
Focarelli, D., Pozzolo, A. F. (2001). The patterns of cross-border bank mergers and 
shareholdings in OECD countries. Journal of banking & Finance, 25, 2305-2337. 
Focarelli D. and Pozzolo A.F., 2005. Where do banks expand abroad? An empirical analysis? 
Journal of Business, 78, 2435-2464. 
Focarelli D., Panetta F. and Salleo, C., 2002. Why do banks merge? Journal of Money Credit 
and Banking, 34, 1047-66. 
Franks, J. and Mayer, C., 1996. Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure. 
Journal of Financial Economics 40, 163-181. 
Goergen, M. and Renneboog L., 2004. Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and 
cross-border takeover bids, European Financial Management, 10, 9-45. 
Holl P. and Kyriazis D., 1997. Agency, bid resistance and the market for corporate control. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24, 1037-1066. 
Holl P. and Kyriazis D., 1996. The determinants of outcome in the UK take-over bids. 
International Journal of the Economics and Business, 3, 165-184. 
Jandik T. and Makhija A.K., 2005. The impact of the structure of debt on target gains. SSRN 
n. 679026. 
Jennings R.H. and Mazzeo M.A., 1993. Competing bids, target management resistance, and the 
structure of takeover bids. The Review of Financial Studies, 6, 883-909. 
Jensen M.C., 1988. Takeovers: their causes and consequences. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2, 21-48. 
Jeon J. Q., 2009. How much is reasonable? The size of termination fees in mergers and 
acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 959-981. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2005. Governance matters IV: governance indicators 
for 1996-2004. World bank policy research working paper 3630. 
Kini O., Kracaw W. and Mian, S., 2004. The nature of discipline by corporate takeovers. 
Journal of Finance, 59, 1511–1552. 
Lorenz J.T. e Schiereck D., 2007. Completed versus cancelled banking M&A transactions in 
Europe, Working paper. 
Martynova M. and Renneboog L., 2008. A century of corporate takeovers: what have we 
learned and where do we stand. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 2148-2177. 
Morck R.M., Shleifer A. and Vishny R.W., 1989. Alternative mechanisms for corporate control. 
American Economic Review, 89, 842-852. 
19 
 
Morgan D., 2002. Rating banks: risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry. American 
Economic Review, 92, 874-888. 
O’Sullivan N. and Wong P., 1998. Internal versus external control: an analysis of the board 
composition and ownership in UK takeovers. Journal of Management and Governance, 2, 17-
35. 
O’Sullivan N. and Wong P., 1999. Board composition. Ownership structure and hostile 
takeovers: some UK evidence. Accounting and Business Research, 29, 139-155. 
Pozzolo A.F., 2009. Bank cross-border mergers and acquisitions (causes, consequences and 
recent trends). In Alessandrini P., Fratianni M. and Zazzaro A. (eds), The changing geography 
of banking and finance. Spinger. 
Schoenberg R. and Thornton D., 2006. The impact of bid defences in Hostile Acquisitions. 
European Management Journal, 24, 142-150. 
Sudarsanam, P.S., 1995, The role of defensive strategies and ownership structure of target 
firms: evidence from UK hostile takeover bids. European Financial Management, 1, 223-240. 
Walking R.A., 1985. Predicting tender offer success: a logistic analysis. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 20, 461-478. 
Wong P. and O’Sullivan N., 2001. The determinant and consequences of abandoned takeovers. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 145-186. 
20 
 
Figure 1 
Completed and abandoned M&As 
 
 
Completed and abandoned Mergers and Acquisitions between 1992 and 2010, recorded by Platinum Worldwide 
Mergers and Acquisition Database, provided by Security Data Corporation (SDC). 
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Table 1 
Variable Description 
Variables Source Description 
Deal variables 
Withdrawn SDC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal is withdrawn, 0 otherwise. 
Hostile SDC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal is hostile, 0 otherwise. 
Multi-bidders SDC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there are multiple bidders, 0 otherwise. 
Cross-border SDC 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal involves banks from different counties, 0 
otherwise. 
Stock payment SDC 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the payment of the transaction is settled with stocks, 0 
otherwise. 
Cash and stock SDC 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the payment of the transaction is settled in part with stocks 
and in part with cash, 0 otherwise. 
Lockup SDC 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bidder has a call option on the common shares or on certain 
assets of target bank, exercisable in the event of a merger with another buyer, 0 otherwise. 
Number of days SDC Number of days between the announcement data and the outcome data. 
Deal value SDC Log of the transaction value. 
Total asset bidder SDC Log of the value of total asset of bidder. 
Deal value / Tot ass. bidder SDC Ratio between the value of transaction and the total assets of bidder. 
Liquidity target / Deal value SDC Ratio of the liquid assets of the target over the value of the transaction. 
   
Country Variables   
Credit to GDP Word Bank Total credit to GDP ratio. 
Stock market / GDP Word Bank Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio. 
Stock market / Credit Word Bank Stock market capitalization to total credit ratio. 
GDP per capita IMF GDP per capita. 
Concentration Word Bank Share of the total assets of a country’s five largest banks over total bank asset. 
   
Regulatory Variable   
Regulators risk aversion 
Buch and 
DeLong (2008) 
Index that measures the sensitivity to the assumption of risk of the supervisory authorities and it 
varies from 0 to 12 (higher value corresponds to a greater risk sensitivity). 
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Table 2 
Deal and bank characteristics 
 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Median St. Dev.  Minimum Maximum 
A. Full sample  
       
Deal Value (USD millions) 11,607 169.53 26.52 491.96 0.09 5.846.10 
Total asset bidder (USD billions) 7,969 60,614.5 3,687.40 162,186.80 5.90 1,266,359.00 
Deal Value / Tot asset bidder  5,336 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.00 1.64 
Liquidity target / Deal Value 1,961 4.23 0.91 11.07 0.00 104.04 
       
B. Completed deals 
       
Deal Value (USD millions) 11,080 160.00 25.91 464.91 0.09 5,846.10 
Total asset bidder (USD billions) 7,552 60,906.97 3,680.70 162,752.90 5.90 1,266,359.00 
Deal Value / Tot asset bidder  5,101 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.00 1.64 
Liquidity target / Deal Value 1,850 4.26 0.91 11.23 0.00 104.04 
       
C. Abandoned deals  
       
Deal Value (USD millions) 527 369.82 46.24 863.48 0.16 5,677.99 
Total asset bidder (USD billions) 417 55,317.91 4,003.70 151,655.90 6.40 1,207,825.00 
Deal Value / Tot asset bidder  235 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.49 
Liquidity target / Deal Value 111 3.77 0.87 7.82 0.00 58.79 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample, dropping observations with a value greater than the 99th 
percentile and below the first percentile of the sampling distribution; Panel B those for banks involved in an M&A 
announced in the following year and eventually completed; Panel C for banks in an M&A announced in the following 
year and eventually abandoned. 
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Table 3 
Country and regulatory characteristics 
A. Full sample  
Variables Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Credit / GDP target 20,870 134.15 139.22 51.98 12.47 214.39 
Stock market / GDP target  20,683 97.91 99.34 45.75 4.77 265.29 
Stock market / Credit target  20,820 1.80 1.44 8.11 0.13 962.47 
GDP per capita target 21,122 28,856.79 30,047.22 11,886.64 1,538.55 50,008.19 
Concentration target 15,046 59.26 56.21 22.60 28.54 100.00 
Regulators risk aversion target 21,049 8.28 10.00 2.23 2.00 11.00 
B. Completed deals 
Variables Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Credit / GDP target 19,920 134.42 140.28 51.90 12.47 214.39 
Stock market / GDP target  19,745 98.20 99.34 45.66 4.77 265.29 
Stock market / Credit target  19,870 1.81 1.44 8.301 0.13 962.47 
GDP per capita target 20,147 28,964.33 30,047.22 11,849.65 1,538.55 50,008.19 
Concentration target 14,446 59.29 56.14 22.57 28.54 100.00 
Regulators risk aversion target 20,098 8.27 10.00 2.23 2.00 11.00 
C. Abandoned deals  
Variables Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Credit / GDP target 950 128.54 135.51 53.43 13.18 214.39 
Stock market / GDP target  938 91.73 86.42 47.30 5.04 265.29 
Stock market / Credit target  950 1.72 1.46 1.03 0.18 8.01 
GDP per capita target 965 26,611.60 28,762.68 12,429.80 1,560.68 49,797.25 
Concentration target 600 58.54 57.21 23.38 28.54 100.00 
Regulators risk aversion target 951 8.42 10.00 2.20 2.00 11.00 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample, dropping observations with a value greater than the 99th 
percentile and below the first percentile of the sampling distribution; Panel B those for banks involved in an M&A 
announced in the following year and eventually completed; Panel C for banks in an M&A announced in the following 
year and eventually abandoned. 
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Deal Value 1                  
2 Total asset bidder (log) 0.55 1                 
3 Deal value / Total asset bidder 0.21 -0.38 1                
4 Liquidity target / Deal value -0.26 -0.07 -0.09 1               
5 Credit / GDP target -0.02 0.18 -0.33 -0.10 1              
6 Stock market / GDP target -0.10 -0.08 -0.13 -0.22 0.46 1             
7 Stock market / Credit target 0.05 0.22 -0.12 0.17 0.23 -0.60 1            
8 Concentration target 0.04 -0.03 0.23 0.16 -0.62 -0.54 0.14 1           
9 Regul. risk aversion target -0.02 0.03 -0.20 -0.21 0.56 0.47 -0.16 -0.76 1          
10 GDP per capita target -0.01 0.11 -0.27 -0.11 0.73 0.45 0.04 -0.42 0.38 1         
11 Number of days 0.04 0.00 -0.11 -0.15 0.16 0.22 -0.13 -0.31 0.34 0.10 1        
12 Withdrawn 0.03 -0.08 0.08 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.04 1       
13 Hostile 0.11 -0.03 0.14 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.10 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 0.16 1      
14 Multi-bidders 0.10 -0.03 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.33 0.40 1     
15 Cross-border 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.00 -0.24 -0.20 0.03 0.33 -0.31 -0.18 -0.16 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 1    
16 Stock payment 0.10 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 0.10 0.35 -0.27 -0.35 0.27 0.04 0.22 0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.20 1   
17 Lockup 0.12 0.03 -0.10 -0.10 0.15 0.32 -0.18 -0.31 0.23 0.05 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.33 1  
18 Cash and stock payment 0.07 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.15 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.35 -0.05 1.00 
 
 
 
  
25 
 
 
Table 5 
Deal characteristics, regulatory and country variables  
  Panel A Panel B 
  Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
     
Hostile 1.48936*** 
(0.4112) 
0.3669 1.3979*** 
(0.4738) 
0.3043 
Multi-bidders  1.6372*** 
(0.0652) 
0.3907 1.5951*** 
(0.0985) 
0.3717 
Cross-border -0.1461*** 
(0.0592) 
-0.0020 -0.0781 
(0.0655) 
-0.0046 
Stocks payment 0.2261*** 
(0.0611) 
0.0322 0.2116*** 
(0.1034) 
0.0317 
Cash and stocks payment 0.1081* 
(0.0606) 
0.0029 0.1194*** 
(0.0431) 
0.0101 
Lockup -0.5712*** 
(0.0633) 
-0.0281 -0.5514*** 
(0.1132) 
-0.0205 
Number of days 0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 0.0011*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
Regulators risk aversion  
target 
  0.0423*** 
(0.0163) 
0.0038 
GDP per capita  
target 
  -0.1509*** 
(0.0454) 
-0.0076 
Credit to GDP  
target  
  0.0045*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0001 
Stock market to GDP  
target 
  -0.0039*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0002 
Stock market to credit  
target 
  -0.1552*** 
(0.0604) 
-0.0046 
Concentration  
target 
  -0.0005 
(0.0027) 
-0.0002 
         
Observations 20,558  13,970  
 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the deal was abandoned and zero if it was successful. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1. The model is estimated using a probit specification. In Panel A, dummies for specialization, 
bidder and target countries and years are included but not reported. In Panel B the specification does not include target 
country dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The symbol *** indicates a level of significance 
equal to 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 percent. The marginal effects show the partial 
change in the likelihood with respect to the variation of each independent variable, evaluated at the sample mean value 
of each variable. 
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Table 6 
Deal characteristics individual variables 
  Panel A Panel B Panel C 
  Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
       
Hostile 1.6179*** 
(0.4376) 
0.3657 1.6989*** 
(0.5550) 
0.3640 3.1975** 
(1.4239) 
0.3084 
Multi-bidders  1.5404*** 
(0.0693) 
0.3135 1.5727*** 
(0.1674) 
0.3237 2.1038*** 
(0.0483) 
0.3804 
Cross-border -0.4302*** 
(0.1028) 
-.0136 -1.1761*** 
(0.4061) 
0.0016 -8.7743*** 
(0.5496) 
0.0253 
Stocks payment 0.0738 
(0.0866) 
0.0184 0.3235*** 
(0.0839) 
0.0342 0.4911*** 
(0.1701) 
0.0203 
Cash and stocks 
payment 
-0.0523 
(0.0853) 
-0.0018 0.0234 
(0.0451) 
0.0031 -0.1960** 
(0.0963) 
-0.0112 
Lockup -0.5991*** 
(0.0633) 
-0.0268 -0.6271*** 
(0.1213) 
-0.0262 -0.0915 
(0.0685) 
-0.0157 
Number of days 0.0011*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 -0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0000 
Deal value (log) 
 
0.0850*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0048 0.1390*** 
(0.0469) 
0.0085 0.0799 
(0.0645) 
0.0130 
Deal value / 
Total assets bidder 
  0.1324 
(0.21624) 
-0.0159 0.6743* 
(0.3955) 
-0.0269 
Total assets bidder 
(log) 
  -0.11295*** 
(0.0167) 
-0.0065 -0.1399*** 
(0.0430) 
-0.0104 
Liquidity target / Deal 
value 
    0.0142*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0014 
            
Observations 10,870  4,509  882  
 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the deal was abandoned and zero if it was successful. For variable 
definitions, see Table 1. The model is estimated using a probit specification. In Panel A, dummies for specialization, 
bidder and target countries and years are included but not reported. In Panel B the specification does not include target 
country dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The symbol *** indicates a level of significance 
equal to 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 percent. The marginal effects show the partial 
change in the likelihood with respect to the variation of each independent variable, evaluated at the sample mean value 
of each variable. 
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Table 7 
Survival Analysis 
  Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
     
Hostile 1.2403*** 
(0.4393) 
1.4430*** 
(0.4517) 
1.5159** 
(0.6752) 
1.2709* 
(0.6515) 
Multi-bidders  1.8696*** 
(0.1004) 
1.9198*** 
(0.1734) 
2.1722*** 
(0.1521) 
2.1311*** 
(0.1770) 
Cross-border -0.4394* 
(0.1715) 
-0.8059*** 
(0.2671) 
-2.3008** 
(1.1307) 
 
Stocks payment 0.1231** 
(0.0596) 
0.1091 
(0.2671) 
0.3150** 
(0.1318) 
0.0776 
(0.0971) 
Cash and stocks payment -0.0625 
(0.0747) 
-0.0741 
(0.0783) 
-0.1542 
(0.1125) 
0.0750 
(0.0875) 
Lockup -0.9756*** 
(0.0770) 
-0.9727*** 
(0.0664) 
-1.0237*** 
(0.1644) 
 
Deal value (log) 
 
 0.0797*** 
(0.0210) 
0.2476*** 
(0.0928) 
 
Deal value / 
Total assets bidder 
  0.0719 
(0.6276) 
 
Total assets bidder   -0.2388*** 
(0.0435) 
 
GDP per capita  
target 
   -0.0000* 
(0.000) 
Credit to GDP  
target 
   0.0083* 
(0.0043) 
Stock market to GDP  
Target 
   -0.0090*** 
(0.0039) 
Stock market to credit 
target 
   -0.2500* 
(0.1462) 
Concentration  
target 
   0.0032 
(0.0075) 
Regulators risk aversion  
target 
   0.0451 
(0.0786) 
       
Observations 12,111 8,023 4,231 7,492 
 
The dependent variable is time elapsed between the deal announcement and outcome, considering the number of 
completed and abandoned deals. The model is estimated using the Cox specification. In Panel A, B and C dummies for 
specialization, target and bidder country are included. In Panel D the specification does not include target country 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The symbol *** indicates a level of significance equal to 1 
per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
 
